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Abstract: 
 
Focus: This paper focuses on perceptions of Qatar’s suitability to act a successful sports event 
host and in doing so, looks ahead to some of the key organisational challenges facing Qatar 
leading up to the World Cup in 2022. This work is framed around perceptions of nation 
branding and soft power and draws on the experiences of various key demographics who 
offer valuable insight into Qatar’s World Cup.  
Design: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with football journalists, experienced 
tournament staff and volunteers, football supporters and expatriates working in the Gulf 
region. The work is longitudinal in nature, with data collected between January 2010 and June 
2018 including seven FIFA and FIFA-affiliated confederation events, namely: the 2011 Asia 
Cup in Qatar, the 2011 Gold Cup in USA, the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, the 2015 Copa America 
in Chile, the 2016 European Championships in France, the 2017 African Cup of Nations in 
Gabon and the 2018 World Cup in Russia. 
Findings: The work uncovers several concerns and considerations connected to hosting a first 
Middle Eastern World Cup in Qatar in 2022. The findings demonstrate some of the key 
organisational challenges facing the event which were found to include supporter access, 
security and the fan experience.  
Originality/Value: This paper examines Qatar in the context of the 2022 World Cup and its 
connection to soft power and nation branding. This particular event is so significant, not 
simply because it is the showcase tournament of the globe’s most popular sport from both a 
spectator and participation perspective, but because it represents such a notable divergence 
from previous editions. The majority of preceding World Cups have/will be hosted by highly 
populated countries with relatively developed football traditions and/or infrastructures. As a 
change to this pattern, the unique position of Qatar’s World Cup renders it an important case 
study. This work which examines informed perspectives relating to access, security and 
diplomacy provides a number of issues for Qatar's World CUp organisers to consider. 
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Introduction – Qatar and small state politics: 
The connections between individual nations is of significant importance to today’s global 
networked society. Attempts to understand modern states have often involved imposing 
categorisations, relative to scale for instance. This has been subject to various approaches. 
Related definitions of ‘small states’ have in particular proven elusive, often lacking in 
consensus within the academic community, although landmass, population and per capita 
income typically feature in such classifications (Maass, 2009). The international significance 
of individual nation states has often been dominated by the perception, ability and use of 
military and economic power. Small states have typically been considered to lack 
international visibility, and have frequently been framed as vulnerable actors with minimal 
influence in the international arena (Panke, 2016). This has mainly been attributed to the 
respective lack of military, economic and political capabilities, leading to the adoption of a 
proportionately low profile and set of defensive foreign policy strategies (Braveboy-Wagner, 
2010). Rather than engaging in disputes and demonstrating influence in their own right, small 
states have often been perceived to be restricted and motivated to avoid and mitigate 
conflicts, cooperate with others, and limit their behaviour and sphere of influence to their 
relatively immediate geographical and geopolitical context (Hey, 2003). Furthermore, 
scholars have long argued that small state economies rely primarily on the exportation of a 
sole or limited number of commodities or natural resources, such as crude oil or agricultural 
products (Peterson, 2006). This further proliferates the view of small states as politically 
vulnerable and economically susceptible to exogenous shocks from the international markets 
in which they trade (ibid). Due to these notable limitations, some have concluded that small 
states possess limited control over their position (Mohammadzadeh, 2017).   
As a consequence of recent processes and relevant advancements such as globalisation and 
developments in communication technologies, small states today enjoy more international 
visibility and prestige than at any other time in history (Maass, 2009).  A number of prominent 
examples of small states have developed in stature and now form a significant component of 
the political mosaic and economic landscape adopting active and growing positions in 
international institutions (Mohammadzadeh, 2017). In addition, it has been argued that the 
contemporary political and economic climate can present some small states with a greater 
range of choices and outcomes (Cooper et al., 2014). Whether by maximising economic 
niches in conjunction with considered strategies, leveraging existing capabilities, adopting 
active foreign policy approaches, and/or engaging in strategic nation branding activities, 
many small states can attempt to augment their position in the international arena, limit their 
vulnerability and enhance their visibility (ibid).  
As a significant example of a small state connected to such foreign policy engagements, this 
paper focuses on Qatar, a sovereign Arab state situated on the Persian peninsula of the 
Arabian Gulf. In some respects Qatar can be seen as an unusual and even problematic 
example of a small state. As explored below, it is diminutive in scale (landmass and 
population) but disproportionality influential in economic and political terms, summarised by 
Kamrava’s (2015) recent work entitled ‘Qatar: small state, big politics’. 
With a long history of existence under the domain of numerous different empires, including 
being subject to Persian, Portuguese and Ottoman control, the last century has seen 
significant change in Qatar. A British protectorate from 1916, the country gained full 
independence from the UK in 1971, and has since been ruled as an absolute monarchy. Qatar 
is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a union made up of six neighbouring 
countries (the others being Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E and Oman) which was 
established to help provide an economically and politically stable environment for national 
and regional development. Of Asia’s 51 states, Qatar is 44th in terms of landmass, covering an 
area of 4,416 square miles. Similarly, it is only the 45th most populous country in the 
continent, with a population of 2.6 million, roughly 90% of which is made up of a blue-collar, 
expatriate labour force, who have recently been attracted to the high level of employment 
opportunities offered by the state (Kaplanidou et al., 2016). Despite its relatively diminutive 
geographical and demographic scale Qatar is one of the world’s wealthiest countries: its GDP 
per capita currently stands at £96,827, more than double that of USA (IMF, 2016). Such wealth 
emanates primarily from the international sale of liquefied natural gas and crude oil; Qatar is 
the world’s the largest distributor of the former and third largest supplier of the latter 
(Wright, 2016).  
In many respects therefore, Qatar is not the rule but the exception. The unique combination 
of scale, economic position and potential of the state has facilitated the development of a 
potent and at times problematic foreign policy strategy. Through its various engagements, 
global sport has clearly been adopted as a tool to enhance Qatar’s international connections 
and wield significant influence on the global stage (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014; 2015; 
Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016). For example, the Aspire Academy for Sports Excellence, 
based in Qatari capital, Doha, has positioned itself as one of the world’s leading centres for 
athletic training, development, medicine and rehabilitation. In addition, the Qatar Sports 
Investments (QSi) group has become a major financier of global sport, signing a strategic deal 
with FC Barcelona in 2010 and acquiring Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) in 2012 (for a critique of 
these investments, see Fieldsend, 2017).  
Qatar’s involvement in bidding for and subsequently staging sport mega events (SMEs) has 
however represented the state’s most notable investment in global sport. Alongside hosting 
the 2005 West Asian Games, the 2006 Asian Games, the 2011 Asian Cup and the 2015 Men’s 
Handball World Championships, each year the state stages the Qatar Open Golf Masters, the 
ATP and WTA Tennis Championships, and the Doha stage of the MotoGP World 
Championships. Future events include the 2019 IAAF World Championships in Athletics and 
football’s 2022 FIFA World Cup.  
This paper examines perceptions of Qatar in the context of the 2022 World Cup and its 
perceived connection to soft power and nation branding. This particular event is so significant, 
not simply because it is the showcase tournament of the globe’s most popular sport from 
both a spectator and participation perspective (Rookwood and Hughson, 2017), but because 
in some contexts it represents such a notable divergence from previous editions, including 
the most recent edition, the 2018 World Cup. The majority of preceding World Cups have 
been hosted by highly populated countries with relatively developed football traditions 
and/or infrastructures. That said however, the strategy to move the World Cup beyond 
Western Europe and South America (demonstrated by recent editions hosted in USA, South 
Korea/Japan, South Africa and Russia), could see Qatar framed as part of a connected FIFA 
plan to take football to new frontiers, to globalise the game and expand its markets (Jerabek, 
2017). Nevertheless, hosting a World Cup in a country with such a small population and 
landmass renders Qatar 2022 an important tournament and unique case study.  
Qatar has experienced various political challenges connected to its international relations. A 
notable example concerns the ongoing Gulf crisis instigated by the severing of diplomatic ties 
between Qatar and various GCC countries in May 2017, and the subsequent embargo 
imposed on Qatar. In sporting contexts, the scandals connected to accusations of voter 
bribery and the award of the World Cup to Qatar (examined by Blake and Calvert (2015)) also 
help render the tournament worthy of particular attention. Millward’s (2017) work on Qatar’s 
treatment of its blue collar and primarily South Asian workforce in the physical infrastructure 
projects constructed for the World Cup also draws attention to criticism of and challenges 
faced by the state. The role of FIFA in this context and in examples from other World Cups 
more broadly has been examined, notably in the work of Sugden and Tomlinson (2016) and 
Tomlinson (2018). 
This work examines perspectives of some key demographics including research participants 
with experience of previous tournaments and those with an understanding across different 
national, regional and global sporting and political climates. It gives voice to a range of 
opinions on Qatar’s World Cup and explores the meanings associated with this event, the 
organisational challenges the host nation are likely to face, and the tournament’s perceived 
impact upon and manifestation of soft power and nation branding. Through its findings this 
work offers a contribution to the field and study of sports management by identifying some 
key organisational challenges framed in wider contexts that are relevant to host nations of 
sporting events, both those relevant for small states and others that relate to nations on a 
larger scale. 
   
Soft power, nation branding and sport: 
Examinations of key motives for nation states to engage in transnational sport and host 
related events often references both internal and external motivations. The former may refer 
to attempts to construct a national narrative, and the latter are typically perceived to include 
that which influences and builds connections across political borders and economic divisions 
(Cornelissen, 2010) – and power is one of the most enduring determinants of international 
relations. In a world subject to fluid political and economic environments, accelerated 
developments and processes of globalisation have intensified the requirement for states to 
collaborate across borders (Maass, 2009). Traditional ‘hard power’ approaches to 
transnational relations remain a significant component of the global political landscape. This 
involves coercive approaches intended to influence the interests or behaviour of other 
political bodies, typically via the use of military means and economic incentives. However, 
Mattern argues that ‘the presumption that hard power is the only effective means for getting 
what one wants in world politics has been eroding’ (2005: 587). In contrast to hard power, 
soft power is built on the notion of co-opting and attracting others to want what you want. 
The American political scientist Joseph Nye pioneered this theory, which has often been 
framed in connection with and popularised by U.S. Democratic Presidential Administrations, 
namely that of Bill Clinton and Barak Obama.  
Nye (2009) argues that soft power can be acquired through the attractiveness of a nation’s 
cultural components, its political ethos, and the perceived legitimacy and authority of its 
foreign policies. It is partly through cultural engagements relating for instance to art, 
literature and education, as well as mass entertainment such as films and music, that a 
country can disseminate information, ideologies and images to influence audiences beyond 
its national boundaries (Kim, 2011). Meanwhile, commonly adopted systems of government 
and political values such as democracy, human rights and political and economic liberty can 
serve as models for other countries to admire and adopt. Depending on the respective 
nation’s foreign policy approach, other states may (or may not) adhere to such models, and 
possibly look to them for ‘guidance, example, encouragement and inspiration’ (Vuving, 2009: 
12).  
Relative to hard power resources therefore, soft power equivalents are often more likely to 
be at the disposal of a broader range of nations, including small states – for whom they may 
prove particularly significant (Kim, 2011). Importantly however, the mere potential and 
existence of such resources does not automatically translate into soft power; instead this is 
typically dependent on how they are valued, framed, utilised and received (Ham, 2010). The 
increasing relevance of soft power in international relations has certainly not led to a 
complete abandonment of hard power capabilities. Moreover, nations with ambitions of 
acquiring and benefiting from the former are increasingly attempting to do so in conjunction 
with the latter; a combination of methods known as ‘smart power’. Failed attempts to acquire 
soft, hard and smart power can produce negative consequences for nation states, and in some 
cases can lead to disempowerment. Soft disempowerment for instance can be evident 
through contexts in which a country offends, upsets or alienates others, culminating in a loss 
of influence or attractiveness, as Brannagan and Rookwood (2016) have argued in relation to 
Qatar and SMEs. 
This theoretical framework for examining power is therefore not without critics and criticisms. 
Fan (2008) for instance notes that modern nation states contain a variety of actors, who may 
like a given attraction or not, to different degrees. The resultant impact on policy at the state 
level cannot be assumed, as it may also depend on the influence of particular groups who are 
exposed to a given attraction. In addition, the relationship between two nations is shaped by 
a variety of complex geopolitical and strategic factors and interests in which soft power may 
have limited influence (Wilson, 2015). The difficulty of measuring soft power also complicates 
the process of proving its impact. 
Some argue that soft power is closely associated to the notion of nation branding, in that both 
are ‘concerned with a nation’s interest on the world stage’ (Fan, 2008: 147). Public diplomacy 
has been framed as a subset of nation branding that is focused on a state’s political brand, 
with nation branding relating to how a state constructs, measures and manages its reputation 
and (re)shapes international opinion (Anholt, 2006). In respect to the conceptual relationship 
between public diplomacy and nation branding, others however have suggested that the 
connection is more ambiguous, partly in reflection of the publication of differing conceptions, 
definitions and perspectives notably from scholars between and within fields such as 
international relations and marketing communications (Melissen, 2005). Laqueur depicts 
public diplomacy as a ‘peculiarly American aberration’ (1994: 20), whereas nation branding 
appears more in European and particularly British contexts (Dinnie, 2008).  
Public diplomacy is often thought to rely in part on the mobilisation of soft power resources 
to communicate, attract and influence foreign audiences (Potter, 2009). Unlike traditional 
diplomacy which occurs at the state level, public diplomacy initiatives are typically aimed at 
foreign audiences and are intended to increase their familiarity with a given country, to shape 
external perceptions of a nation’s image, to disseminate ideas and ideologies across borders, 
to foster positive perceptions and to encourage others to view it as an attractive destination 
for tourism and business, etc. (Leonard, 2002).   
While the generic concept of branding emerged from and is often associated with the 
marketing realm of the business world, the contextualised notion of nation branding has 
impacted upon wider political spheres, such as international relations. Published academic 
references appear from the mid-1990s. Anholt for instance argued that ‘the reputations of 
countries function like the brand images of companies and they are equally critical to the 
progress and prosperity of those countries’ (1998: 396). Despite the integrated and fluid 
networks that continue to develop in modern society, many countries engage in increasingly 
aggressive competitions with one another for inbound tourism, trade, foreign investments 
and resources including human capital (Kotler and Gertner, 2002; Brannagan and Rookwood, 
2016). These engagements are typically motivated by key national interests, strategies and 
aspirations: ‘Nations are making increasingly conscious efforts to hone their country branding 
in recognition of the need to fulfil major objectives’ (Dinnie, 2008: 18). Some of what we may 
conceive of as nation branding is state managed therefore, although this can be subject to 
perception and interpretation. Through its various policies and investments which help to 
build the image of the state as a unique and influential small nation, and via a conscious 
connected presentation of self, Qatar have attempted to brand themselves as: an influential 
state (Grix and Brannagan, 2016); a gateway for the people of the Arab world (Blanchard, 
2010); a leader and representative of an imagined pan-Arab community (Kraidy and Khalil, 
2009); and through its sports diplomacy and acquisitions, as a centre of culture and modernity 
(Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016), challenging the notion that globalisation must mean 
Westernisation (Kinninmont, 2013). 
Some practitioners and scholars focus on the visual and cosmetic aspects associated with 
branding. Others include the functional, cultural, emotional and socio-political values framed 
as representative of the essence of a country. This can involve (to varying degrees) a conscious 
differentiation from other nation states. Kotler and Gertner describe nation branding as ‘the 
sum of beliefs and impressions people hold about places… it results from a nation’s 
geography, history, proclamations, art and music, industrial products, famous citizens and 
other social features’ (2002: 251). Emphasising the exclusivity and differential nature of the 
concept, Dinnie depicts it as ‘the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide 
the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target 
audiences’ (2008: 15). Furthermore, Florek (2005) identifies a nation’s ideas, values, culture, 
images, and features as core components of a nation’s brand identity. It can therefore be 
argued that nation branding can rely on utilising a variation of soft power resources such as 
those identified by Nye, in order to define, promote, differentiate and brand a particular 
state. Its effectiveness may partly depend on how these are perceived and received. 
In spite of the efforts of a particular state, both internal and external perceptions will not 
always be directed by activities explicitly connected to its nation branding strategy. Van Ham 
contends that a state’s brand ‘comprises the outside world’s ideas about a particular country’ 
(2001: 2) which may well develop largely independent of any conscious and deliberate 
branding efforts. Anholt (2007) argues that individuals inhabiting complex modern societies 
do not always have the resources or inclination to visit or learn about other countries. Instead, 
individuals may well seek to navigate through the complexity of the modern world armed 
with media representations, stereotypes and simple clichés, which can shape their 
perspective of other countries. Stereotypical associations linking particular countries with 
specific events, exports or perceived characteristics can at times prove problematic. Negative 
associations, stereotypes and commonly held perceptions influenced by connected global 
media representations can present countries with the challenge of redefining, rebranding and 
reshaping externally held views, perhaps moving towards that which emphasises a nation’s 
positive characteristics and soft power characteristics or potential (Olins, 2003).  
Aside from negative perceptions, some states simply lack visibility to international audiences. 
Despite enhanced interconnectivity and advancing technologies, certain nations remain in the 
shadow of their more prominent counterparts, and foreign audiences may not be aware of 
their existence or at least be ignorant to their unique or ‘attractive’ characteristics. Nations 
who proactively, creatively and effectively engage in specific branding strategies to shape 
their reputation are arguably more likely to successfully exert influence and attract attention, 
collaboration, support and investment from those across political divides (Dinnie, 2008). 
Engaging in such efforts does not mean such influence will prove or be perceived as entirely 
positive however (Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016).  
Crucially, some argue that such nation branding initiatives should represent credibility, 
legitimacy and integrity (Keller, 2008). Furthermore, it has been suggested that nation 
branding should extend beyond short-term advertising campaigns, and will only prove 
successful if a holistic, long-term approach is adopted (Bilchfeldt, 2003). According to Olins, 
merely promoting a slogan or logo rarely proves effective, but instead countries should 
attempt to connect with authentic representation: ‘You don’t change people’s perceptions of 
a country with advertising. You change people’s perceptions by finding the truth, finding an 
idea that embraces that truth and putting it through everything they do’ (2007: 60).  
In summary, it can be argued that nation branding initiatives can serve as steps towards 
acquiring soft power by increasing the awareness of international audiences pertaining to the 
unique elements of a nation. Once this awareness has been fostered, recipients may be 
attracted to, reject, or adopt a more neutral position towards a country as a response.  Due 
to the subjective nature of attraction, and the potential variance in how it is received, it is 
important for a country to learn from the perspectives of external audiences – particularly 
those a given state is looking to ‘target’ (Dinnie, 2008). This understanding can shape the 
creation, alteration or enhancement of a brand strategy developed to influence international 
actors, and contribute to the acquisition of soft power. This partly informed the decision to 
focus on international perspectives of Qatar within this research.  
                                                                                     
Sports mega events, soft power and nation branding: 
SMEs have become increasingly significant for contemporary economies, cultures, states and 
sports personnel. Researchers from various fields have examined such events through 
numerous disciplinary lenses, including sociology, economics, politics and tourism. Roche’s 
seminal work on mega events and modernity for instance offers an important contribution to 
our understanding of the origins and significance of these tournaments as forms of public 
culture (Roche, 2009). His early work on the subject helps position SMEs through different 
dimensions of tourism, namely economic, political and cultural (Roche, 1992). He also 
examines the enduring mass popularity of such events in modernity, continuing in a period of 
globalisation, and their extraordinary status owing to the large scale, dramatic character, 
periodicity and international significance of these readily identifiable and memorable public 
cultural events (Roche, 2000; 2003). 
 
As a consequence of the significant global interest in tournaments such as the World Cup and 
the Olympic Games, which are typically evidenced by aspects such as lucrative commercial 
deals and broadcasting contracts, extensive viewer ratings and media exposure (Brannagan 
and Rookwood, 2016), SMEs have been framed as important potential mechanisms for a host 
nation in the pursuit of the acquisition of soft power. Such acquisitions can relate to achieving 
objectives outlined by nation branding and public diplomacy practitioners (Dinnie, 2008). 
Mega events can provide useful public diplomacy platforms for nations to communicate with 
and influence foreign audiences. As with soft power and its relationship with soft 
disempowerment however, there is also the possibility for a range of negative consequences 
in this respect: diplomatic crises can develop in the context of international relations, which 
can negatively impact the branding of a state. This has occurred in the GCC, as explored earlier 
and later in this article. 
SMEs can provide opportunities for a host nation or city to gain international visibility, 
providing means of ‘placing them on the map’ (see: Collins, 2009; Almeida et al., 2013; Grix 
and Brannagan, 2016; Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). Recurrent references across various 
media sources to a particular state in conjunction with a globally significant sporting event 
can raise the profile of the host nation. This often increases the understanding of international 
audiences pertaining to key demographic, geographic, political and sporting features of the 
state in question. In addition, through first hand exchanges and the images and messages 
communicated through an event, global audiences can gain a depth of insight into a host 
nation’s culture, language, heritage, technological and economic capabilities (Cornelissen, 
2010; Grix et al., 2015). In retrospective terms, the collective memory of a SME can often be 
reduced to and framed within the context of particular occurrences. This can range from the 
exhibition of exciting, shared and globally significant sporting spectacles to political 
manipulations including boycotts and terrorist attacks. Such instances are typically 
memorialised in close connection to the host nation or city, and can shape the degree of 
acceptance, attraction and influence over international audiences on the world stage.  
A nation state’s capacity to manage its identity profile via the staging of SMEs can offer up 
significant opportunities. These might involve tackling previous associations with negative 
stereotypes and outdated (mis)conceptions that may have shaped public consciousness in 
light of historical events. Framed in a positive light, the 2006 World Cup for instance was 
considered by some to have provided valuable opportunities for Germany to develop 
progressive international relations, moving away from the image of the Nazi regime (Sutton 
and Rookwood, 2015). The 2010 World Cup presented South Africa with the chance to 
showcase itself as a prosperous, stable and unified country after years of civil unrest under 
the Apartheid regime (Cornelissen, 2010). Having been awarded the 2022 World Cup, the 
event is perceived by many Qataris as an opportunity to demonstrate positive attributes, as 
a stable Arab country in the Middle East, a region which has often been connected to 
instability, conflict and terrorism (Knott, 2014; Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016). For host 
nations, a World Cup can symbolise status, prestige and modernity. Developed and especially 
emerging economies that ‘seek to be coupled in the eyes of the world with positive or globally 
altruistic causes’ may strive to stage SMEs as a way of developing or cementing their status 
amongst the global elite (Giffard and Rivenburgh, 2000: 1).  
Extending beyond the often intangible elements of image construction, are the tangible 
behavioural outcomes that may result from the strategic branding of a nation through a mega 
event. Given that these tournaments are ‘highly malleable to political influence in terms of 
agenda building and frame setting strategies’, hosts often attempt to use SMEs as platforms 
to work towards predetermined goals (Donos and Lowes, 2012: 64). Whether intended to 
help promote tourism, attract foreign investments or establish political and economic 
connections with other states, a host nation often attempts to dominate control over the 
messages communicated in the staging of a SME in accordance with broader objectives (ibid). 
For example, a primary goal of the 2006 World Cup involved promoting Germany’s image in 
order to ‘increase incoming tourism and position Germany as an economic and scientific 
country with which to trade’ (Grix and Brannagan, 2016: 12).  
SMEs offer a range of potential benefits in respect to soft power and nation branding, but the 
prospect of negative consequences in these contexts is also apparent. A nation often attracts 
immediate global attention once it expresses serious intent to host a mega event. Being under 
the spotlight and subject to critique for a prolonged period poses various challenges for hosts, 
and unattractive elements often emerge at the forefront of international headlines. Given the 
criticisms of the state and its preparations for the event, this has been apparent on a perhaps 
unprecedented level with Qatar. This has also been impacted by the exceptional award of the 
2022 World Cup twelve years before the event is due to take place, as opposed to the typical 
eight years. At the other end of the spectrum, Egypt were announced as the replacement 
hosts of the 2019 African Cup of Nations five months before the tournament, with Equatorial 
Guinea declared as the replacement host nation of the 2015 edition just two months prior to 
the event.  
Regardless of the timespan however, media coverage leading up to the event can focus 
(sometimes disproportionately) on the negative aspects of a country, which can influence 
public perception. Even in the pre-event stage attempts to acquire soft power and manage 
nation branding can lead to soft disempowerment, as has arguably proven the case to a 
degree with Qatar, who have come under considerable scrutiny with respect to issues such 
as bribery, corruption and conditions for migrant labour (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2014; 
2015). 
 
Research methods and analysis: 
Fieldwork was conducted over an eight-year period (January 2011 – June 2018) spanning five 
continents. The research was carried out principally at seven FIFA and FIFA-affiliated 
confederation events namely: the 2011 Asia Cup in Qatar, the 2011 Gold Cup in USA, the 2014 
World Cup in Brazil, the 2015 Copa America in Chile, the 2016 European Championships in 
France, the 2017 African Cup of Nations in Gabon and the 2018 World Cup in Russia. A total 
of 30 Semi-structured interviews were conducted with respondents from 20 different nations, 
including six females and 24 males. The initial decision to utilise this research method was 
informed by the work of scholars who have produced useful findings via the application of 
semi-structured interviews in relation to perceptions of soft power (Yang, 2010), public 
diplomacy (Maheshwari, 2011) and mega events (Florek, 2008), an approach also justified and 
inspired by the more recent work of Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015) who have done so by 
examining these elements in combination. These interviews were undertaken, coded and 
analysed in order to gain a depth of insight into what were perceived as key organisational 
challenges facing Qatar’s World Cup, and in the context of perceptions of soft power and 
nation branding. The interviewees were selected for this work as they represented a variety 
of relevant demographics, including football journalists, tournament staff and volunteers, 
football supporters, and expatriates from Europe and North America based in Qatar and 
elsewhere in the GCC. This was informed by existing approaches, such as that of Brannagan 
and Rookwood (2016). 
Fans and journalists were only selected for interview if they had experience of at least two 
previous football mega events. Given the growth and significance of the expatriate labour 
force across different sectors throughout the GCC, this research incorporates representatives 
from this demographic. However, this work does not include the perspectives of the South 
Asian contingent involved in building facilities, as this investigation does not focus on issues 
around the construction of stadia. (For an examination of relational power and 
responsibilities concerning these migrant workers in Qatar, see Millward, 2017). Instead, 
participating expatriates were those employed in the industries of security, media and sport 
in Qatar and UAE. Some interviews were conducted in other locations partly due to the 
difficulty of travelling to Qatar following the significant, ongoing Qatar-Gulf crisis which 
emerged in May 2017. The severing of diplomatic ties between Qatar and various GCC 
countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt) and the embargo imposed on Qatar, with 
land, air and sea borders shut from 5 June 2017 has made it difficult to travel between these 
countries (and impossible to move between them directly), and complicated the prospect of 
conducting interviews about Qatar in those countries.  
Once the data collection stage had been completed, the transcribed interviews were then 
subjected to a thorough thematic analysis. The following coding system is employed here, 
denoting the demographic represented (staff, volunteer, supporter, journalist or expatriate) 
and the country they were from, the city where the interview was conducted (including those 
within the aforementioned mega event host nations as well as in UK, UAE, Turkey and 
Bahrain), the month and year. For example: ‘Brazilian Fan, Rio: June 2014’. Expatriates were 
all from Britain or Canada and based in either UAE or Qatar. For example, a Canadian expat 
working in sport and living in Qatar but interviewed in Istanbul for expediency purposes is 
coded as ‘C-E-Sp-Q, Istanbul: July, 2017’. 
 
Organisational challenges facing Qatar’s World Cup regarding soft power and nation 
branding: 
There have been various relevant criticisms levelled at Qatar by the international community 
relating for instance to allegations of corruption and bribery surrounding the acquisition of 
the World Cup (Blake and Calvert, 2015) and the treatment of its blue collar and primarily 
South Asian workforce involved in the construction of facilities (Millward, 2017). Other critical 
assessments have centred on tournament legacies and the expenditure incurred in 
constructing stadia and other sites, together with connected plans for long term usage 
(Tomlinson, 2018). However, such issues are not examined here. Instead this section sheds 
light on the key overarching themes to emerge from the thematic analysis of this research, 
which centred on some of the perceived organisational challenges Qatar and those present 
at the event are expected to face during the 2022 World Cup. These relate primarily to access, 
security and diplomacy. 
Firstly, in relation to access, two sub-themes were central here: The first centred on concerns 
about how Qatari organisers and local as well as other regional fans would treat those 
travelling from certain countries. There were numerous references to Israel, Israeli and Jewish 
supporters in this respect. For instance, one interviewee argued: ‘What if Israel qualify [for 
the 2022 World Cup]? Most countries in the Middle East don’t recognise them or have 
diplomatic relations with them’ (Brazilian Journalist, Santiago: June 2015); while another 
described the ‘theoretical involvement of Jews and Israel’ in Qatar as a ‘potential security 
nightmare’ (B-E-Se-UAE, London: August 2017). Although Qatar established a bilateral trade 
agreement in 1996 and the Qatar Olympic Committee co-funded the construction of the Doha 
Stadium with the State of Israel in the Israeli city of Shakhnin in 2006 (Zubida, 2016), 
diplomatic relations between the countries have otherwise been limited. Israel’s 
neighbouring entities Syria, Lebanon and Palestine have all qualified for the 2019 Asian Cup 
in UAE, however Israel (who have held UEFA membership since 1994 having previously 
competed in Asian and Oceanian competitions) have not qualified for a major tournament 
since 1970. Qatar have agreed to Israel’s involvement in 2022 pending their qualification, 
although given the unlikelihood of qualification, this issue may only prove theoretical. 
However as one fan argued in a statement that bridged both the concepts of nation branding 
and soft power: ‘If Qatar is trying to brand itself as a centre of global sport, it must be 
diplomatic and show its power and leadership, by including and welcoming those who qualify 
and fans who come from other countries like Israel and wave their flags at matches’ 
(Argentine Fan, Moscow: June 2018).  
An additional sub-theme centred on some of the wider access issues that interviewees 
considered to be significant for Qatari organisers and supporters leading up to the 2022 World 
Cup. For example, one respondent asked, ‘When December 2022 comes around the access 
issues will be about fans. Will everyone be permitted visas to enter Qatar?’ (Brazilian Fan, Rio: 
June 2016). Five years earlier another respondent posed the following questions: ‘Will the 
LGBT community be discriminated against? Will females be free to attend?’ (American Fan, 
New York: June 2011). Furthermore, another suggested: ‘…for those who want to make a 
statement, maybe displaying the rainbow symbol or whatever, the Qataris are going to have 
an issue. Homosexuality is illegal in Qatar… But imprisoning a fan on this basis would have 
serious PR consequences for Qatar’ (German journalist, Paris: June 2016). Such ‘fundamental 
cultural differences between East and West’ as one respondent referred to them as could 
‘undermine Qatar’s attempts to brand itself as a progressive state, depending on how they’re 
managed’ (English Journalist, St Petersburg: June 2018).  
A recent study found that same-sex sexual contact is illegal in 74 countries, and punishable 
by death in 13 states, including Qatar (The Independent, 2016). However, according to Article 
296 of the current Penal Code in Qatar, sodomy between men can lead to imprisonment for 
a minimum of one year and a maximum of five years depending on the case (Al Meezan Qatar 
Legal Portal, Article 296). The same penal code applies to other sexual acts including 
prostitution within the country. Furthermore, according to Wasserman (2017) such forms of 
intolerance do not automatically translate into punishment or exile. In Qatar homosexuality 
is ‘practiced privately and denied publicly’ on a small scale and some consider it possible to 
comply with the state’s interpretation of Sharia law by ‘“being” gay but not “doing” gay’ (ibid). 
One respondent discussed these issues in relation to perceptions of Russia’s position on 
homosexuality in 2018. ‘There have been some protests here [in Moscow] and I do think there 
is intolerance of public displays of homosexuality, but ultimately I think Russia have managed 
to control the narrative at least. Qatar will look to do the same’ (Mexican Fan, Moscow: June 
2018). The content, direction and control of messages emanating from a country before and 
during a mega event being hosted there can be considered important in the context of soft 
power (or disempowerment), and the cultural influence on international audiences. This can 
be connected to the importance of using soft power to influence others, which Nye frames as 
a ‘battle to win hearts and minds’ (2008: 94). Such communication is also an important 
component of the state’s public diplomacy (George, 2016; Nye, 2008). For Qatar 2022, as with 
Russia 2018, the challenge for the state extends beyond managing expressions of 
homosexuality (in this case) but also the media’s framing of the respective state as 
‘welcoming of all people’ (Mexican Fan, Moscow: June 2018). 
Despite the modernization and development of Qatar and other GCC nations which are 
central to their nation branding strategies (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015), these states are 
commonly perceived to be extremely conservative. In attempting to balance traditional and 
modern societal values Qatari women are permitted to vote, run for municipal elections and 
participate freely in parts of public and social life, while maintaining a high profile in 
professional and educational settings (Golkowska, 2017). A recent study found that 51% of 
Qatari women were employed in 2016, which is the highest proportion of female employment 
across the Gulf (AT Kearney, cited in The New Arab, 2016). Nevertheless, women in Qatar do 
face certain restrictions, notably within specific male-dominated environments. This 
gendered social exclusion has been recurrent across various international contexts, with 
sports such as football typically regarded as a traditional male persevere in and beyond Qatar 
(Cecamore et al., 2011). Women are not banned from attending games in Qatar but the 
practice of social exclusion which positions Qatar in ideological contrast to that of many 
Western countries will inevitably shape levels of (dis)engagement amongst female supporters 
from outside the Gulf. As one observer noted at the 2011 Asian Cup in Qatar, ‘I’ve seen most 
teams play here but only seen a handful of females. What will happen at the World Cup?’ 
(Australian Fan, Doha: January 2011). The resultant profile of supporters in attendance in 
2022 may shape external perceptions of Qatar which, to apply Nye’s (2008) work on soft 
power, could impact upon the resultant acquisition of soft power/disempowerment and the 
subsequent perceptions of the nation relative to how it has been branded.  
The second overarching theme to emerge from the analysis of this research centred on event 
security and safety management. All 30 interviewees made reference to the words ‘security’ 
and/or ‘safety’ in discussing the organisational challenges facing the 2022 World Cup. For 
instance, in looking ahead to 2022, one interviewee argued: ‘Hooliganism is a potential 
problem. Some still want to fight if they’re allowed. There has to be effective policing [in 
Qatar], as a response and deterrent’ (Welsh Fan, Bordeaux: June 2016). When discussing the 
perceived threat of hooliganism, several interviewees referred to the scale of Qatar in relation 
to other SME host nations. For example, one respondent argued: ‘Unlike Russia or Brazil, 
Qatar is a small country and fans from all over will be mixing, including rivalries. Segregation 
outside of stadiums won’t be easy... They’ll have to police it carefully, and use football 
intelligence, particularly from those countries with a hooligan problem’ (B-E-Se-UAE, London: 
August 2017).  
However, in referencing the experience at the 2018 World Cup, one supporter suggested 
crowd management could be positively approached and influenced by events in Russia: ‘If 
intelligence is shared then Qatar should be able to follow Russia’s lead. Because despite all 
the fears, there’s been no trouble here, so far. If Russia can prevent hooliganism, maybe Qatar 
can too’ (Swiss fan, Kaliningrad: June 2018). By restricting instances of football violence, it 
was argued that Qatar can help switch attention to its showpiece event and ‘demonstrate its 
unique culture’ (ibid), in a way that can build and promote the acquisition of soft power and 
its position on the global stage. 
In addition however, some interviewees articulated their fears over the associated “threat of 
terrorism”: ‘For people gathered in large public spaces the threat of terrorism has increased 
– especially in the Middle East. Any terrorism issues in Qatar, even just a credible threat, but 
certainly an attack, that’d mean people associating terrorists with the Middle East more, even 
though it’s a World Cup... Beyond any direct consequences it would be a catastrophe for how 
Qatar is viewed’ (B-E-Se-UAE, London: August 2017).  
Qatar’s acquisition of the World Cup was considered to represent a degree of risk, given the 
prevalence of conflict and terrorist activity in the region (Scharfenort, 2012) and the proposals 
to construct 12 stadia within a 20-mile radius, creating crowd management and other 
logistical challenges (Farred, 2016). In soft power/disempowerment terms, despite Qatar 
attempting to present itself to international tourists as a safe and attractive location – which 
forms a key country branding strategy (Ginesta and San Eugenio, 2013) – it was argued here 
that the media coverage which has associated the World Cup with a ‘high-risk’ location has 
potentially damaged the state’s reputation to a degree: ‘If the World Cup passes without any 
problems, any terrorist attack or fan problems, Qatar can say they’re powerful enough to host 
any event or people safely. But the press coverage means people are questioning that power 
and might be too scared to go’ (German Fan, Lille: June 2016). If the World Cup is attended 
primarily by those from Arab nations, and supporters from other parts of the world choose 
not visit in similar numbers to those seen in Brazil in 2014 for instance, which had over a 
million international visitors (Rookwood, 2017), this could undermine Qatar’s engagement 
with and influence on a global audience, and limit opportunities to showcase its wider cultural 
characteristics accordingly. However, according to one interviewee the 2018 World Cup 
‘should give Qatar hope. The huge numbers of Latin Americans here [in Russia] could well be 
seen in Qatar. They bring the festival, and Qatar gets to play host, with the world watching’ 
(Swiss fan, Kaliningrad: June 2018). The World Cup is perceived by many to represent 
potential in the context of soft power therefore, subject to the engagement and management 
of the tournament. 
The decision to travel to a specific city or country is often shaped by how attractive and 
desirable a given destination is perceived to be (Ragavan et al., 2014). Consequently, a 
negative image or media representation can severely damage the reputation of a given place 
and its existing and future branding and potential to build a successful and sustainable 
tourism industry (Avraham, 2009). As more states develop nation branding initiatives in order 
to compete for international trade and tourism, target markets (including individual tourists) 
may find it difficult to form balanced and positive opinions on a specific destination’s features, 
and thus come to rely on simple clichés and dominant mediated narratives (Anholt, 2007). In 
this case the findings of this work illustrate the view of Qatar as both an ‘exotic and potentially 
dangerous place’ (B-E-Se-UAE, London: August 2017), and highlight the challenges facing 
event organisers and nation branding practitioners to mitigate such perceptions and present 
Qatar as a safe and reliable SME host. Some also suggested the event could prove ‘pivotal to 
how Qatar and the entire region is then viewed, positively or otherwise’ (English Journalist, 
St Petersburg: June 2018). 
Although a number of possible challenges were discussed by interviewees, in offering some 
solutions to potential organisational problems here, many respondents suggested Qatari 
organisers should carefully approach the use of Fan Parks. At each World Cup since 2006 ‘FIFA 
Fan Fests’ have been set up in host cities, with organisers converting large, centrally located 
public spaces to temporarily erected, secure fan facilities (Rookwood, 2018): ‘Fan parks have 
changed football tournaments. You pass through security, and it’s enclosed, so everyone 
knows it’s safe… You mingle with fans and watch matches on a big screen and drink beer. 
Plus, there’s entertainment on stage between the football, and from the sponsors. Everyone 
loves it!’ (Belgian Fan, Rio: June 2014). Another respondent suggested: ‘Qatar should promote 
their fan parks leading up to the World Cup as a chance to come together from across the 
world and experience the best of Qatar’ (German Fan, Lille: June 2016). 
A combined 30 million people visited the Fan Fests at the 2006, 2010 and 2014 World Cups 
with no major disorder reported (Rookwood, 2017). 82% of visitors in Brazil shared their 
experiences on social media and 86% suggested the Fan Fests improved their experiences 
(FIFA, 2016). One interviewee claimed this is a key if “indirect” component of a state’s 
branding: ‘Host nations need to provide the best experiences for fans, who then share them 
on social media, reaching people at home… Official branding is therefore connected to and 
supported indirectly by visitors, fans themselves. Official messages are therefore legitimated 
or undermined’ (English Journalist, St Petersburg: June 2018).  
According to one respondent a key reason for the widespread popularity and engagement in 
fan parks is that “fans are allowed to drink. It’s secure and they’re monitored and they 
behave” (Brazilian Volunteer, Rio: June 2014). However, highlighting another organisational 
challenge in this respect, another interviewee suggested: “Dry fan parks won’t go down well 
in Qatar” (Northern Irish Fan: Lyon, June 2016). There were plans to prohibit the sale of 
alcohol in both stadiums and Fan Fests at the 2018 World Cup, as with Russia’s 2017 
Confederations Cup, reflecting an assumed causal relationship between alcohol consumption 
and spectator violence, following significant hooliganism at Euro 2016 (Rookwood, 2017; 
2018). However, alcohol was served at fan parks in Russia and ‘in the stadiums the beer was 
alcohol-free but some supporters are used to that situation anyway’ (English Journalist, St 
Petersburg: June 2018). 
For legal and cultural reasons, a strict approach is expected in Qatar: ‘The laws in Qatar may 
make it impossible for drinking, but football fans are used to drinking. Here we have no 
problems inside the Fan Parks’ (French Staff, St Etienne: June 2016). However, one supporter 
interviewed in Qatar predicted that the organisers of the 2022 World Cup would provide 
excellent service in these facilities, and that the frames of reference would prove beneficial: 
‘Judging by the fan zones at the last two World Cups [2006 and 2010] there’s room for 
improvement with the entertainment and food. I expect Qatar’s World Cup to be spectacular, 
to provide the absolute best of both, partly as a distraction from the fact they’re alcohol-free.’ 
(Australian Fan, Doha: January 2011). Similarly: ‘If Qatar doesn’t want its World Cup 
dominated by the alcohol issue is must provide great food and entertainment in stadiums and 
fan parks’ (Swiss fan, Kaliningrad: June 2018). 
Related to this point, the final overarching theme to emerge from the analysis of these 
research findings centred on diplomacy, notably concerning the current GCC dispute between 
Qatar and its Gulf neighbours. One interviewee argued that Qatar’s position on alcohol 
consumption could actually have a positive although perhaps unintended impact on the 
diplomatic standoff, through a resultant broadening of peripheral engagements in the World 
Cup: ‘The GCC-Qatar dispute has made a lot of headlines but I think UAE realise they can get 
a slice of the tourism pie. For instance, Qatar is dry and fans drink, and there have been talks 
lately of fans staying in Dubai, flying to Qatar for games and coming back to Qatar to celebrate 
and party and drink. Alcohol consumption is certainly easier in UAE than Qatar… The standoff 
could still last a while, but the eventual softening of UAE’s position will be shaped by 
connections like these’ (B-E-Se-UAE, London: August 2017). Another interviewee suggested 
that the staging of and involvement in the 2019 Asian Cup could prove “crucial” to the 2022 
World Cup: ‘Qatar have qualified for the Asian Cup here [UAE]. If the GCC dispute is resolved 
by then… 2019 could help restore normal relations. It could be crucial to the World Cup 
running smoothly... If Qatar pull out though, you’d fear for the management of 2022’ (B-E-Sp-
UAE, Dubai: July 2017). 
Most respondents interviewed after the boycott was initiated in May 2017 expect there to be 
a diplomatic resolution, with one intimating it would represent a ‘governance fiasco on a par 
with anything FIFA had ever resided over’ (B-E-M-Q, London: July 2017) if the GCC crisis 
prevented the World Cup from taking place in Qatar. When questioned about likely means of 
approaching a resolution, some respondents referred to the use of financial resources. For 
instance, one interviewee argued: ‘With Qatar, money tends to solve everything’ (C-E-Sp-Q, 
Istanbul: July, 2017), and another framed the Gulf state as ‘a brand of wealth, resources and 
power’ (B-E-Se-UAE, London: August 2017). Another participant presented the crisis as an 
“opportunity”: ‘The crisis is obviously not positive for Qatar. But it is also actually an 
opportunity for them to demonstrate their power and standing in the world. If they come 
through this and mediate peacefully and then host a successful World Cup it may well cement 
their place as the most powerful small nation on earth’ (C-E-Sp-Q, Istanbul: July, 2017). 
Finally, the 2022 World Cup was therefore perceived by respondents in this research to 
provide Qatar with opportunities to demonstrate its power and status, through peaceful 
mediation, on which grounds it was partly awarded the event in the first instance (Brannagan 
and Rookwood, 2016). Such opportunities were thought to provide potential for nation 
branding and the acquisition of soft power through the resultant influence on a global and 
captivated audience; but these possibilities were set against ‘considerable risk to the 
reputation of Qatar, the Gulf, the Middle East and FIFA’ (B-E-M-Q, London: July 2017) should 
the boycott undermine and ultimately prevent the World Cup from taking place in Qatar. 
 
Conclusion: 
‘You tend to think of branding as… immediately recognisable and visible. Arriving in Doha you 
see huge planes all in national colours with ‘Qatar’ stamped on them… The national airline 
promotes itself as the ‘World’s five-star airline’. Its mission is ‘excellence in everything’. Their 
branding starts on arrival” (C-E-Sp-Q, Istanbul: July, 2017).  
As a significant example of a powerful small state committed to branding itself as a modern 
centre of world sport (Ginesta and San Eugenio, 2013), Qatar have invested heavily in 
international sport over the last decade, with the 2022 World Cup the intended pinnacle of 
the portfolio. Staging what some perceive as the ultimate sporting event in the Middle East 
for the first time would represent an achievement in itself, especially if the tournament is well 
received by fans and visitors and is heralded relative to ‘the usual test – of being the “best 
World Cup ever”’ (English Journalist, St Petersburg: June 2018). Previous work has found that 
many of those who travel to World Cups are positive about the prospect of Qatar’s event 
(Brannagan and Rookwood, 2016), but the findings here indicate that a number of 
organisational challenges remain apparent. These relate primarily to access, security and 
diplomacy. 
Access issues for female supporters arguably presents the challenge on the broadest scale. I 
conducted research at Qatar’s 2011 Asian Cup (at which there were no fan parks) and 
watched every competing team play, yet saw only six females in stadiums across fourteen 
matches. Conversely, Fan Fest sites at the 2006 World Cup in Germany, which served as 
‘levers’ for improving fan experiences in terms of engagement, inclusivity and interaction, had 
over 18 million users, 44% of which were women, with no major public disorder reported 
(Grix, 2012). There are models for inclusive, safe, and effectively managed mega events 
therefore, which also places prospective hosts under increased pressure – including but 
certainly not limited to Qatar. According to respondents in this research, the 2018 World Cup 
has ‘positively influenced most people’s perceptions of Russia’ (English Journalist, St 
Petersburg: June 2018) and Qatar’s organising committee might want to consider looking to 
‘follow their example’ (ibid) in some respects. The Fan identification system (also serving in 
part as a visa waiver) employed in Russia 2018 is one such example. 
Predicted restrictions of access for female supporters, and the response to associated cultural 
expectations of those who do choose to attend presents further challenges for the organisers 
of Qatar’s World Cup. The access for, involvement of and behavioural restrictions placed upon 
LGBT supporters is another concern in this respect. In addition, the threat of hooliganism 
highlighted by fan violence at Euro 2016 emphasises the significance of Qatar’s crowd 
management techniques. With 12 stadiums situated within a 20-mile radius, segregating rival 
supporters is a potential organisational concern. Complex and fluid notions of rivalry can be 
shaped by the players themselves, as was evident at the Serbia v Switzerland game at the 
2018 World Cup where Swiss forward Xherdan Shaqiri angered Serbian supporters with a 
celebration of his last minute winning goal that invoked ‘nationalist symbols that celebrated 
his Kosovan heritage’ (Swiss fan, Kaliningrad: June 2018), resulting in some unexpected crowd 
disorder. 
It is uncertain whether the use of a Western-centric view of effective football intelligence and 
proportionate policing usually recommended for football mega events (Rookwood, 2017; 
Rookwood and Spaaij, 2017) will or should be adopted in Qatar. This would represent an 
important addition to the knowledgebase in respect to future research. Such potential 
problems may depend partly on the results of the qualification process, tournament draw and 
schedule of fixtures. The connection between this form of control and the hard/soft power 
discourse is also noteworthy here. Furthermore, terrorism was also perceived here to be a 
particular concern for the management of Qatar’s World Cup, given the relatively ‘high risk’ 
location and the reputational association of the Middle East with terror attacks. The 
occurrence or absence of terrorist activity in the region around the timeframe of the World 
Cup is likely to have significant consequences for subsequent nation branding and soft power 
possibilities, as well as approaches to public diplomacy. 
Many of these concerns and potential organisational challenges have however been framed 
as opportunities in this research. Most respondents commented on the wealth of Qatar, 
which one interviewee perceived as ‘a key feature of the state’s brand identity. Read anything 
ever written by or about Qatar, it will always reference its GDP status’ (German Journalist, 
Paris: June 2016). The general consensus of this research is that Qatar’s nation branding 
practitioners are perceived to have an important role in the build up to the 2022 World Cup. 
The findings here also suggest that there is confidence that Qatar can use its considerable 
financial resources to prepare for and manage the World Cup effectively. One connected 
priority in this respect could include approaching the 2019 Asian Cup as an opportunity to 
rebuild peaceful ties with other GCC states and begin to engage in cooperative partnerships 
with neighbouring countries in mitigating the current diplomatic crisis (notably concerning 
the group match between Qatar and Saudi Arabia). This could perhaps involve mediating roles 
played by the relatively neutral Gulf States of Kuwait and Oman. 
Subsequently, during the World Cup the use of Fan Fests as innovative spaces and 
entertainment centres could provide fans with alternatives to alcohol, and encourage visitors 
to promote their experiences and excitement via social media and thus connect with a more 
global audience, and legitimise and reinforce the work of Qatar’s nation branding 
practitioners. Finally, despite the apparent challenges, the potential remains for Qatar to offer 
visitors the chance to experience the country in a relatively moderate winter climate, 
showcasing a relatively inclusive version of the ultimate sporting event that represents a 
showpiece of a nation branding strategy, facilitating the acquisition of soft power. 
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